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ABSTRACT
Privatization efforts in government owned water and
wastewater systems have expanded rapidly in recent years
as operating costs, technical requirements, and capital
outlays have escalated.  Maximum economic welfare can
be achieved only if competitive elements are introduced.
Feasible possibilities include franchise-bidding, franchise
bidding with modified rate regulation, and contracting
out.  The government agency itself can become a
competitive bidder.  Contracting out has become the
major mode of injecting competition and, if managed
well, can be an effective device to reduce costs and
improve the quality of service.
INTRODUCTION
Competition is beginning to intrude into industries that
have been used as classic examples of monopoly.  Water
and wastewater have joined long-distance telephone,
electric utilities, and small city commercial airline service
in the erosion of monopoly market structures.  The
consequences of the introduction of competition in these
industries have moved the market toward greater
aggregate economic welfare.
Most public water systems began as private,
profit-motivated companies in the nineteenth century.
However, major water quality problems often leading to
outbreaks of typhoid and cholera, and problems in
fighting fires in rapidly growing urban centers persuaded
government to begin the takeover of water systems.
Subsequently, as local governments sought to extend
public water supply to areas outside the more affluent
enclaves of the city that could afford water service, most
early companies could not manage to simultaneously
cover the cost of extending service while maintaining
affordable rates to full-paying customers and earning a
profit.  Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, more
than 200 communities had shifted from private to public
ownership (Westerhoff, 1998) and publicly owned and
operated local monopoly had become the dominant model
for service delivery.  In 1997, public water system
monopolies served 86 percent of the population and
generated 85 percent of total water system revenue (See
Table 1).
Table 1: U.S.  Community Water Systems by OwnershipType, Population Served, and Annual Revenue
Ownership Number % of Total Number % of Total
Population Served
Annual Revenue
($Billion)
Public 21,789 43% 86% 22.2
Private 16,540 33% 13% 3.7
Ancillary 11,960 24% 1% N/A
Source:  1995 Community Water System Survey, U.S.  Environmental Protection Agency, 1997
7Table 2: U.S.  Wastewater Publicly Owned Treatment and Collection Systems in 1996
Treatment Facilities % of Total Population
Served
Collection Systems Annual Expenditures,
including capital**
($Billion)
16,024 71.8 20,670 $23.6
Sources:  1996 Clean Water Needs Survey, U.S.  Environmental Protection Agency, 1997; 
       **U.S.  Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government Finances by Level of Government:  1994-1995
Similarly, the United States (U.S.) wastewater industry
evolved primarily in response to the public health threat
posed by water pollution.  In order to guarantee the full
recognition of negative externalities and the installation
of appropriate treatment facilities, local governments
assumed the ownership and operation of wastewater
systems.  Table 2 shows that publicly-owned systems
serve 71 percent of the U.S.  population.
However, some movement toward injecting competition
into these monopoly markets began to occur by the
mid-1980s and accelerated in this decade.  In the late
1980s, it was estimated that only 100 to 200 water and
wastewater facilities were under contracted operation–the
major form of competition Association of Metropolitan
Sewerage Agencies and Association of Metropolitan
Water Agencies (AMSA/AMWA, 1998).  By 1997, a
survey of just 14 major industry contractors found that the
number of contracted facilities had grown to 1,200,
located in 44 states and Puerto Rico.  Some industry
observers predict that contracting will grow in the range
of 20 to 30 percent in the next five years.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE U.S.  MARKET AT
THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY
Monopolies, especially those in the public sector, resist
change as the status quo confers benefits on public
officials, public employees, public managers, government
unions, and private sector input suppliers (see Seidenstat,
1997).  Several factors, however, have begun to accelerate
the opening up of these monopolized markets.  
More stringent federal environmental and public health
regulatory standards, Clean Water Act requirements that
escalated costs substantially, and the drastic reduction in
federal government construction subsidies have created
major problems for local governments.  Injecting private
sector competition offers to minimize these costs while
enabling the systems to achieve the technical
sophistication and the capital investment required.
Moreover, enormous capital outlays will be required in
the near future as facilities built with large government
subsidies in the 1970s and 1980s require replacement.
At the same time, the federal government’s restrictive
policies toward the use of public-private arrangements
have been softened.  Changes in the law relating to the
sale of public systems to private investors and the U.S.
Treasury’s change in tax regulations supporting
long-term contracting have removed some major
economic obstacles to using private providers.  
OBSTACLES TO ENTRY
Historically, these markets contain elements that have led
to a monopoly market structure.  The presence of
significant scale economies, major capital outlays
required, the likely duplication of pipe collection and
distribution systems, and government’s concern about the
maintenance of quality in an existing water/wastewater
market as manifested in laws and regulations remove the
typical form of competition: the enlargement of the
number of sellers in an existing market via entry.  
Water and wastewater industries generally qualify as
natural monopolies as one optimal sized treatment plant
would monopolize the market since the output of a
minimum efficient size firm would equal or exceed total
demand at present prices.  Also, doubling the volume of
water transmitted would not double the transmission
costs, causing unit transmission cost to decline with
volume.
Capital costs are extremely large for these systems.  For
example, just for the replacement of water mains and
other distribution system infrastructure, the American
Water Works Association (AWWA) estimates required
spending of $325 billion over the next 20 years.
(AWWA, 1999).  Similarly, in the wastewater field the
U.S.  Environmental Protection Agency estimates that in
the light of the Clean Water Act, required infrastructure
spending will be a minimum of $332 billion over the next
20 years.  A recent study shows that $10 to $12 of capital
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generated in the water industry compared to just $3 to $4
of revenue for electric utilities and $3 for telephone
companies (Haarmeyer, 1994).
MODES OF INJECTING COMPETITION
Given the structural conditions in the water and
wastewater industries, monopoly emerged as the favored
market structure for public policy makers, especially in
light of the growing concern for public health and a
cleaner environment.  In the water industry a limited
number of franchises were awarded to private companies
but regulation proved to be a complex state function.
With the concern for the level of rates, the difficulty of
regulating private monopolies, and the attractive
economic rents available to public officials, government
owned and operated enterprises emerged as the norm for
wastewater operations as well as for many local water
markets.
By the 1980s, however, it became clear that there were
operational deficiencies in public operation.  Rates were
rising, water quality was not always acceptable to many
customers and to environmental groups, and sometimes
subsidies from the general fund were necessary.  By the
1990s, rising capital costs, associated with larger facility
replacements and stricter federal quality requirements,
and the necessity to introduce and manage a more
complex technology required a new approach to the
operations of water and wastewater systems.  Government
decision makers were pressed to find alternatives to the
present system.
The general approach that began to be followed was to
depend more on the private sector to design, build, and
manage systems.  At the same time, it became clear that
improved operations and lower costs would require the
injection of competition in the context of a monopolized
market structure.  Alternatives were available to local
governments that ranged from injecting competition in
the awarding of franchises to competitively awarded
contracts to private operators.  The following sections
discuss the alternatives.
Common Carrier Network
The most extreme proposal that seems to have little
support in the U.S.  (although more likely to be discussed
in some other countries) is to treat the local pipe
distribution system as a common carrier.  The concept is
to use common carrier regulation, as was used for oil
pipelines and as is being tried in telephone and electrical
utility markets, as a device to allow and encourage entry
(Webb and Ehrhardt, 1999).  
As used in a local water market, the pipe system would
serve as a conduit along which competing water
treatment plants would send their product to a customer.
The owner of the distribution network would charge the
supplier for the water placed in the system.  The network
owner would bill water delivered to customers and the
collections would be remitted to the supplying company.
Competition for customers would be rate-based.
Government regulation of retail rates would no longer be
necessary.  The network system would lead to lower rates,
however, only if there were no significant scale
economies for treatment plants.  Such systems to be
effective would have to meet other requirements:
1. a relatively large market area so that there would be
sufficient demand to warrant more than one optimal
treatment plant;
2. suitable sources of supply and locations for multiple
treatment plants;
3. comparable water quality from the competing treated
water suppliers.
Although theoretically feasible, this technique presents
some major technical and administrative difficulties.  In
water systems, there may be only one viable source of
supply that could not be easily shared or efficiently
distributed among several treatment plants.  Mixing
water of different characteristics and quality may present
some major problems in maintaining mandated water
quality.  Administratively tracking the flow of water for
billing purposes potentially poses high transaction costs.
For wastewater systems, significant scale economies may
preclude the use of several suboptimal plants.  Further,
the mixing of the wastewater in the collection system
would preclude plant specialization, an important way to
cut costs, and require all plants to be able to treat all
varieties of waste.
In addition to these technical and administrative
complexities, the vested interests inherent in the present
systems would present a major political obstacle to
installing a common carrier system.  Not only would the
present economic rents be permanently lost but also the
stranded costs that exist in both privately and publicly
owned systems would have to be compensated.  
If entry by means of a common carrier network is ruled
out for administrative, economic, or political reasons,
then to inject competition would be restricted to those
techniques that could simulate competition without
having more than one existing product supplier in a given
geographical market.
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practically all of the treatment of wastewater now comes
from government-owned systems, the injection of
competition focuses on the public sector.  However,
reforming the existing privately owned water monopolies
is not a trivial issue but this paper will not address that
issue except to argue that some of the methods associated
with privatizing public systems may be applicable to
reforming public regulation of private monopolies.
The objectives of injecting competition either in the
context of existing facilities or the installation of new
facilities are usually stated as follows:
1. restrain or lower rates
2. improve product quality
3. maximize innovation and technological updating of
facilities
4. minimize capital costs
Franchise Bidding
Reverting to past practice in the water industry, local
governments can exercise the option of offering a
franchise for a local area.  Private providers will compete
for the rights to operate an exclusive system.  However,
competitive bidding for the acquisition of monopoly
rights would not necessarily provide the benefits of lower
rates or better service.  The traditional technique for
regulating monopolies in the U.S.  has been to subject
them to the supervision and control of a government
agency.  Such public regulation has not necessarily been
effective in achieving the goals of minimizing rates and
providing high quality service.
The U.S.  has seen very little of transferring ownership of
existing water/wastewater systems from public to private
hands.  One example is the sale of two small water
systems in New Jersey to a private company.
France, however, actively followed the franchising path
in restructuring their water systems.  It recognized the
limitations of traditional rate regulation.  Consequently,
France sought other ways of effectively injecting
competition.
The French concept was to structure the bidding in terms
of rates to be charged to users and the quality of the
service to be provided.  The winning bidder then would
be responsible to a public agency whose major task would
be to monitor contract compliance.  If properly operated,
the system offers competitive results – low prices and
high quality service – in a monopolized market.
There are two variants of the French application of this
model.  In the concession version, the bidder finances,
owns, and operates the utility.  The firm operates as a
private utility.  The franchise is typically for 30 years.
The agreement includes a formula for setting rates.
The alternative arrangement, affermage, is where the
local government finances the facility but the private
company operates the system and is responsible for
providing working capital.  The local government is
responsible for all capital outlays.  A formula fixes rates
that often include a surcharge to be remitted to the
government for repayment of debt.
There are several possible criticisms of this system of
franchising.  One reservation is that the bid package is
complex and may be difficult to evaluate.  More
fundamental is the charge that contract enforcement is
likely to be weak, especially since the contract is for a
long duration; thus, some mechanism must be built into
the rate bid to allow adjustments for inflation of costs and
changes in technology and demand.  Also if the franchise
will change hands after the present term, the incumbent
firm may stint on maintenance and repairs as the contract
expires.  Since these issues have to be dealt with and the
contract is not self-enforcing, some government
regulatory agency must be in place.  
In response, advocates for the French model argue that
these problems are tractable, especially in the case of
water systems.  The technology is not complicated or
rapidly changing so evaluating bids and assessing
performance is feasible at a modest cost.  Rebidding an
expiring contract can be effective since the bidders are
likely to be experienced in operating franchises.  The
incumbent firm can be required to post a bond to insure
adequate maintenance and repairs, even at the end of the
contract period.  The government agency would have
narrow and well-defined responsibilities that would not
begin to approach the level of intrusion in the market
process of the traditional public regulatory authority (See
Hanke and Walters, 1999 for a discussion of these issues).
Franchising with Modified Rate Regulation
When Britain privatized its water industry in 1989, it
followed the traditional path of awarding monopoly
franchises to private utilities and subjecting them to
public rate regulation.  However, the British recognized
the limitations of public regulation.  If rates are linked to
costs, there is no incentive to cut costs.  On the other
hand, if regulators set a fixed price with no reference to
costs, there is a strong incentive to cut costs but profits
can soar with no benefit to the consumer.  If prices are
linked to what is happening elsewhere in the industry,
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then a strong incentive to reduce costs below the industry
average exists and the consumer benefits.  The British
adopted this “rate indexing” or “price capping” system.
Under the British system, rates are related to average
costs in the industry, not just the average cost of the
individual utility.  This modified system recognizes that
under traditional rate regulation if a utility operates at
lower cost, its rates will be reduced to reflect the
enhanced profitability.  A flexible rate system is in place
that allows automatic adjustment for inflation (using the
Consumer Price Index) and rate of technological advance
in the industry (the “k-factor”).  The k-factor is adjusted
every five years to reflect changing technology and is
linked to the cost functions of all private water utilities.
A water utility cost model is used to fix industry average
costs.
Although the British system has much potential as a way
of improving efficiency and reducing the costs of
operations by having companies compete with the
industry standard, it will not likely maximize economic
welfare.  Under this system, well-run companies can
generate large benefits that may not be shared fairly with
consumers in the form of lower prices.  What seems to be
missing is rate competition among private firms
competing to secure a franchise.
Contracting Out
Local governments in the U.S.  generally have not used
franchising in privatizing their water or wastewater
systems.  Turning over existing assets to private firms is
fraught with potential negative political fallout from the
beneficiaries of the status quo and the risk of poor
performance of operators not under direct government
control.  Moreover, most public officials are aware of the
limitations of traditional public regulation and the policy
difficulties of attempting to switch to a French or British
model.
At the same time, the pressure to contain costs and meet
the ever-more challenging water and wastewater
standards have motivated local governments to turn to the
private sector for help.  The preferred path is to hire
private firms to operate and maintain (O&M) their
existing facilities and to design, build, operate, and
maintain new plants.
The evidence is that the private firms often can improve
performance.  They often possess greater expertise since
their size and unfettered salary structure can attract the
most experienced and best-qualified technical and
managerial personnel.  Properly structured incentives can
induce them to seek the lowest cost mode of operation.
Their easy access to capital and a less restrictive
operating environment support an emphasis on optimal
updating of facilities, preventive maintenance, and
worker training.
Local government authorities seeking O&M contractors
utilize a bidding process in letting contracts.  Open
competitive bidding, if effectively managed, can lead to
minimum feasible cost of operations and use of
state-of-the-art technology that provides a high quality
product.  Careful specification of performance
requirements contained in the request for proposal (RFP)
is necessary to ensure that the bids are comparable and
that the price offered is consistent with the standards of
output required.
Once the contract has been let, monitoring of the contract
is essential in maintaining the integrity of the process.
Generally, the contract will specify that all water quality
and environmental requirements are met.  The
government authorities must be prepared to penalize the
contractor or even terminate the contract if contract
provisions are violated.  
Although the federal government rule changes that now
allow for longer term contracts has been very helpful in
inducing many private operators to bid on contracts, the
time limit of the contract can be an effective device in
assuring contract compliance as well.  Moreover, the
threat of rebidding as the contract expires means that
competition over rates and service can be periodically
renewed.  
Outsourcing Specific Services
In the past it was not unusual for government agencies to
contract out a variety of functions that were required in
providing a specific service.  These were not core
functions but rather tended to be supportive of the main
function.
For water and wastewater companies, billing and
collection, meter maintenance and reading, specialized
engineering services and other activities were outsourced
to private vendors.  The public agency felt that the private
sector had greater expertise or could perform the function
at a lower cost.  Often the service was put out for bid and
competition among bidders secured a favorable price.  
Managed Competition
In the 1980s as local governments in the U.S.  explored
privatizing some of their services, it was increasingly
recognized that the injection of competition could play a
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key role in improving service and reducing costs.  A few
cities further realized that the threat of outside
competition might be an effective way to provide an
incentive for city workers to assist in restraining costs.
Not only could privatization be used as a threatening
alternative but it could also be employed as a device to
foster competition between private suppliers and the city
agencies.  The public agency could bid on service
contracts for services the city currently was performing.
This procedure became know as “competitive
contracting” or, more recently, “managed competition.”
Once a local government chose a government service as
a candidate for contracting out, then RFP’s would be
developed and bids accepted.  The city agency would be
a bidder.  Often, if the city entity was the low bidder or
the best private bid was not significantly lower than the
city bid, the city agency would retain the service
provision.
Since local government cost accounting is often not a
very sophisticated activity, especially in the allocation of
overhead costs, the issue of accurate costing by the city
agency in its bidding effort soon was raised.  Are the city
and private bids comparable? If the city agency could
ignore traceable costs, it might be able to underbid its
private sector rivals.
Critics of managed competition argue that, in fact, the
city agency often does underestimate costs and
consequently unfairly retains the right to render services.
In the process, the private firms contend that they have to
expend resources and are tricked into providing free
insights as to how to improve services.  Moreover, the
critics complain that the winning government bidder does
not have to live up to the bid since no penalties are
usually assessed if costs exceed the promised level.  The
private sector bidder would lose the contract or would
have to absorb the higher costs in the form of lower
profits or increased losses.
In many local governments managed competition is
proved to be an effective way to restrain costs and
improve services.  Some cities have used it effectively as
a lever to reduce the wage demands and work constraints
that city unions have employed.  Moreover, in the climate
of competition, the restructuring of government
operations can be accelerated.  
CONCLUSION
The major issue in the operations of water and
wastewater systems in the U.S.  is not whether the
facilities are owned or even operated by public or private
providers.  Rather the major concern is whether the
structure of the market can be made more competitive so
that the technically and economically feasible outcomes
are achieved.
What is often a pure monopoly market may have
competitive elements injected into it in order to improve
performance.  Such competition can be developed either
with or without direct privatization but, ultimately, the
participation of the private sector is essential to make this
competition work.  Various alternatives exist that can be
used to inject competition.  However, simply allowing
private utilities to take over all service areas is not
considered a solution to the problem of water/wastewater
system performance since the present system of rate and
service regulation has several flaws.  
Thus, public policy makers turn to other altenatives.
Bidding for exclusive franchises based upon a
price-service offer is one alternative.  More traditional
franchising but with modified regulation in the form of
price capping is another choice.  
Contracting out through bidding has become the
predominant method of injecting competition.  Variant
forms of contracting are also employed such as
outsourcing non-basic activities and allowing public
agencies themselves to be competitive bidders.
Contracting appears a less radical policy since it includes
the retention of public ownership, a limited time frame of
the contract that can involve repetitive bidding, and
easier resumption of government operations if necessary.
Contracting out offers the benefits of competition while
rapidly acquiring a high degree of political acceptability.
Since there is mounting evidence of the superiority of
private operations of privately operated systems, the
future looks very promising for the spread of privatization
through contracting out.  The general acceptance that this
is a viable public policy is seen in the case of
Chattanooga.  Currently serviced by a private regulated
water utility, city officials are unhappy with the
performance of the utility and are suing to remove the
private company’s franchise.  If successful, the city
decision makers plan to take ownership and to contract
out the operation to a private company on a bid basis.
The Chattanooga case illustrates that rapidly
disappearing political resistance to using private
operators to manage water and wastewater systems.  The
O&M alternative (and managed competition using the
prospect of O&M) has become the “best practice.” Even
greater use of the private sector to manage systems
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appears likely.  However, local governments should
consider exploring other alternatives to injecting
competition that might offer even greater social benefits.
Paul Seidenstat holds a Ph.D.  in economics from
Northwestern University and is an associate professor at
Temple University.  He has written a number of articles
and edited several books in the area of public finance and
privatization of government services.
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